Private Charity as a Public Good?

post by Paul Kelleher

Milton Friedman (Capitalism and Freedom, ch. 12):

The heart of the [classical] liberal philosophy is a belief in the dignity of the individual, in his freedom to make the most of his capacities and opportunities according to his own lights, subject only to the proviso that he not interfere with the freedom of other individuals to do the same. [...]

[The classical liberal] will regard private charity directed at helping the less fortunate as an example of the proper use of freedom. And he may approve state action toward ameliorating poverty as a more effective way in which the great bulk of the community can achieve a common objective. He will do so with regret, however, at having to subsitute compulsory for voluntary action.

The egalitarian will go this far, too. But he will want to go further. He will defend taking from some to give to others, not as a more effective means whereby the "some" can acheive an objective they want to achieve, but on grounds of "justice." At this point, equality comes sharply into conflict with freedom; one must choose. One cannot be both an egalitarian, in this sense, and a liberal.

Friedman never explains why, on his classical liberal view, I am permitted to take your money if that is required to make my pursuit of private charity "more effective." Nor does he explain why I am permitted to do this if I and others are coercively promoting charity, but not if we are coercively promoting "justice." All we are told is that once the goal becomes justice rather than charity, then "at this point, equality comes sharply into conflict with freedom." Huh?

The same questions arise for someone who believes (1) that the market gives people what they deserve and are entitled to keep, but (2) some "altruistic well-to-do" are too weak-willed to give to charity on their own, so they need to call in goverment to make them give, even if the non-altruistic well-to-do are thereby forced to give up some of their "just deserts." Like Friedman, Greg Mankiw never explains why this is a stable position to hold. 

Comments

[Brendan Saloner]

It's uncanny that you write about this tonight, because I was just a moment ago thinking about a related issue. In any case, from the passage you quote it seems to me like Friedman could either be arguing (1) that state action solves a public good problem because it induces participation in a scheme that virtually all people might want to participate in but wouldn't participate in on their own, or, (2) state action allows for better coordination of resources that makes it the most efficient actor to address an altruistic motivation, even if the sacrifice for the efficiency is some amount of coercion. I take him to be saying (2), but it seemed like you were leaning on (1). (2) seems like a coherent position to hold -- if everyone on our block enjoys Christmas decor which we could either provide (badly) on our own, or put in the hands of our bossy but talented neighbor Martha Stewart, we might be willing to suck it up and submit in advance to a coercive scheme that takes our decorating money and allocates it to Martha to spend. That's how I think of it. In any case, it's interesting because conservatives and libertarians often make the case that the state is not very efficient at doing altruistic things (like job training, social services, food assistance), and so it should get out of the assistance business and leave it up to private individuals and private charities.

[Paul Kelleher]

B, Your Scenario 1 has "virtually all people" wanting to participate, but needing some push; and your Scenario 2 has "everyone on our block" wanting nice Christmas decor. Each of these shares with Mankiw's scenario the feature of a unanimous charitable desire. Friedman, for his part, refers to the charitable desires held by "the great bulk of the community." But at least Friedman's characterization acknowledges the clear truth: that there will be at least some (a probably a sizable sum) of individuals who explicitly do.not.want the government in the business of "taking from some to give to others." (Indeed, many of these people dislike that idea for many of the very same reasons Friedman expresses elsewhere in his book.) So what I find puzzling is the quick and unexplained overriding of their objections, and the quick and unexplained embrace of a policy that Friedman claims would be unjust if it were pursued in the name of justice rather than charity. Why is the "great bulk of the community" justified in riding roughshod over the freedom of those surely many people who do not agree with forcible transfers?

That is the instability I do not understand. And if pressed, I would say that Friedman and Mankiw realize that it's unseemly to forbid all tax-and-transfer schemes, but they can't figure out how to justify that in a coherent way. So they handwave and hope we won't notice. Or maybe even they don't notice their own handwaving. I really have no idea.