Self-Rule and Mutual Concern

post by Paul Kelleher

In one of his first posts at his new philosophy-oriented blog, Will Wilkinson writes:

I like Bill [Glod]'s notion of freedom as self-rule, but I think specifying the meaning of "self-rule" is not at all easy, and does not obviously lead to what most of us would consider a "libertarian" conception of freedom. Of course, we're all constantly subject to the wills of others. People are constantly enjoining and entreating and wheedling and shaming and peer-pressuring and so forth. One doesn't want to say that self-rule or autonomy requires total immunity from the influence of others. And it's plainly circular to say the problem is being subject to an external will in a way that limits our freedom. But I think noting that helps us to see that the question is not really one of being subject to an external will or not, but of the way in which one is made subject to an external will.

I agree with Wilkinson that it is not wise to seek total freedom from the influence of others. In a modern economy, the state must play key roles to keep the wheels of economic prosperity turning. But I cannot support giving the state this power unless I am willing to let others exert control over me through political choices that determine how it will be used. What I can do, however, is demand that others take this influence they have over me seriously. Not only do I expect them to use it wisely--to forward only policies they think just and effective--but I also expect them to acknowledge the influence they have over my life and the special relationship that this creates between us. In trying to muddle through together the best we can, we make ourselves vulnerable to one another. I think this situation arguably gives rise to special duties of mutual concern. When you continue to cooperate with me even though I help to coerce you through support for laws that you may not fully agree with, I owe you something significant in return. What we give to one another is the sort of thing sports commentators refer to as "intangibles." It doesn't necessarily show up in a breakdown of national GDP, but it deserves special recognition nonetheless.*

I believe this approach to civic duty is in the same family as the outlook expressed in chapter 2 of Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom. Consider the following passages:

[T]he organization of economic activity through voluntary exchange presumes that we have provided, through government, for the maintenance of law and order to prevent coercion of individual by another, the enforcement of contracts voluntarily entered into, the definition of the meaning of property rights, the interpretation and enforcement of such rights, and the provision of a monetary framework. (27)

[T]he characteristic feature of action through explicitly political channels is that it tends to require or to enforce substantial conformity...If we are to use some of our resources for such indivisible items, we must employ political channels to reconcile differences. The use of political channels, while inevitable, tends to strain the social cohesion essential for a stable society...Unanimity is, of course, an ideal...We must perforce accept something less. (23-4)

The notion of property...has become so much a part of us that we end to take it for granted, and fail to recognize the extent to which just what constitutes property and what rights the ownership of property confers are complex social creations rather than self-evident propositions...The [various forms of property] may perhaps emphasize the role of generally accepted social rules in the definition of property. It may suggest also that, in many cases, the existence of a well specified and generally accepted definition of property is far more important than just what the definition is. (26-7)

It is clear that Friedman acknowledges what John Rawls later termed "strains of commitment"--i.e. the fact that it can be difficult to continue one's cooperation under laws and policies one disagrees with or finds burdensome. And it is also clear that Friedman believes there's a role for the state that goes beyond the protection of some putative scheme of natural rights. This modern role leads to increased strains of commitment, since "Every extension of the range of issues for which explicit agreement is sought strains further the delicate threads that hold society together" (23-4). Given this situation, Friedman says it is most important that political channels deliver a decisive verdict on socially contested policies---at least then people will know what rules they are dealing with, and they can adjust to form rational plans.

I agree with Friedman that establishing rules of the game is of signal importance. But it should not overshadow the fact that social stability and economic prosperity depend on individuals' complying with the rules despite strains of commitment. Elsewhere Friedman refers to the "self-denying" character of normal political cooperation. I do not think it is a large jump from this outlook to one that says: when others give me their self-denying cooperation under laws I help to coercively impose upon them, I owe them something special in return. If that's right, then Friedman's stated view bears a family resemblance to a view on which these "intangibles" are the source of politically enforceable positive duties. For example, tax-financed social insurance programs may--may--be the proper vehicle by which our self-denying cooperation with one another is duly acknowledged and honored.

This variation on Friedman's outlook would take us beyond the libertarian's comfort zone of duties stemming from externalities. For my duty to support your medical care may have nothing to do with my causal relationship to your need, and everything to do with my social relationship to you. To use Wilkinson's phrase, this form of mutual concern may be what's required if we are to subject one another to an external will in the right way. 

*I am influenced here by the work of Richard W. Miller. For the most recent statement of his view, see chapter 2 of his Globalizing Justice. 

Comments

[Brendan Saloner]

Contrast these two different lines of reasoning:
1. I would rather not be coerced to pay taxes in order to give my neighbor a stimulus check, but I recognize that the government policy authorizing this tax and transfer was democratically decided upon by elected politicians pursuing a policy that they believed was just and effective.
2. I would rather not be coerced to pay taxes in order to give my neighbor a stimulus check, but I recognize that the state creates specific duties to fellow citizens, whom I value and care about, and that requires me to contribute to a set of policies that over the long run will tend to represent the collective will of the people.

I take it that these are two very similar ways of reasoning about our duties to support policies that are coercive, and which may not represent our preferred policies. The difference is that 1) appeals primarily to duties we owe to a state qua a special relationship with our government and its elected officials, 2) appeals primarily to duties we owe to fellow citizens, which are mediated by the state, but have their own intrinsic value. Is this distinction clear? Some of what you say seems to straddle these two categories.

[Bill Gardner]

Nice distinction, Brendan.

[Paul Kelleher]

Thanks for the comment, Brendan. First, I'm uncomfortable making this about stimulus checks. Stimulus checks are intended in part to improve the aggregate economy, not just (and not necessarily primarily) the situations of those who receive them. Is it OK if we refer instead to, say, unemployment insurance or Medicaid coverage? I'm concerned here with policies that are designed primarily to help the individuals who receive the benefit, not policies that may help people in part because of its indirect effects.

Your distinction is useful, but I do not mean either (1) or (2). My point is that you acquire a duty of concern for your compatriots _even if (and perhaps in part because) you get the policies you want_. Each side of your distinction describes duties that emerge from the *content* of democratic decision-making: either the laws passed now by the majority or else the set of policies "that over the long run will tend to represent the collective will of the people." But duty of mutual concern that I'm arguing for derives not as much from the content of the general will as from the *manner* in which the general will (whatever it is at any given time) is upheld and enforced. It is upheld by individuals giving their cooperation under coercive arrangements that they may disagree with. My view--and I agree this needs further argumentation--is that this deserves special recognition, because it is a contribution of a special kind. I think this is the case *even if* there is a general duty to obey the law. Here's an analogy: even if a parent has a duty to care for a child, complying with that duty, and doing so in a manner that that leads to a good upbringing, calls for special recognition from the adult child. Yes it was the parent's duty, but parents make so many sacrifices and invest so much love even when things are hard and when corners could be cut, that a reciprocal form of concern is called for.

Although I think this is a helpful analogy, I don't want to rely too much on it, if only because it gives this false impression that I think of a society as one big family. Nor I do claim to have elucidated the *magnitude* of the mutual concern I believe we have an obligation to display. Right now I'm just trying to understand it's nature and origins.

Let me know if that clarifies things or only makes them more opaque.

[Paul Kelleher]

I suppose another key weakness in the parent/child analogy is that children tend already to care for their parents, whereas I'm building an argument for why they *should* care about their parents. It is a key feature of my argument that it goes through even if no one ever develops strong fellow-feeling for their compatriots. The obligation is to display concern for another's needs, and this can be done through support for various social insurance policies. The obligation is *not* to become the sort of person who sees his compatriot's good as part and parcel of his own. I think that demands to much of people. (This is a difference between my view and Miller's view.)

[Brendan Saloner]

A thought about your analogy: I suppose a child that consistently and willfully disobeyed or acted counter to her parents could create strains of commitment between the parent and child. Imagine this in the case of older teens or young adults that consistently pursue policies that they know that their parents will detest. This could reasonably give parents less grounds to value their parent-child relationship, and can limit the amount of aid that parents are compelled to give their children.

I want to clarify something (and then should read Miller's book), you say that the duty of mutual concern derives "from the *manner* in which the general will (whatever it is at any given time) is upheld and enforced. It is upheld by individuals giving their cooperation under coercive arrangements that they may disagree with." So is it open to a libertarian or some other person who wants pay less taxes to withdraw their support from society? They can't in practice (except moving to some other country), but doesn't your theory need an opt-out to make participation meaningful?

[Paul Kelleher]

As I said, I don't want to place much weight on the parent/child analogy. I shouldn't have even used it (I thought I had learned that lesson, but I am weak!). I really did want to use it to make one _very narrow_ point, which is: even if a parent has a duty to provide for a child, one deserves special recognition for fulfilling that duty. A child who was brought well should not say "I don't owe you any special thanks since you were just doing your duty." That is my point.

As for an opt-out clause, I take it your point is that although I claim we should reward strained cooperation by showing mutual concern, strained cooperation is only "meaningful" (your word) if it's voluntarily given. Is that right? I didn't want to commit myself to a view on opt-outs. If one allows opt-outs, then those who stay could give the sort of cooperation you think meaningful. But if opting out is not allowed, or if it's too burdensome to be a genuine option (as I agree it is/would be), then I'm not sure I see why cooperation within those constraints cannot be meaningful in the relevant way. Think of a culture that may emerge among a population of unjustly imprisoned or isolated individuals. Are you saying duties of mutual concern between members may be incompatible with such a culture, on account of the involuntary nature of their confinement?

Feel free to take this into email if you like.

[Brendan Saloner]

Thanks much! I should have avoided returning to the parent-child analogy.

The last sentence of your comment is interesting:
"Think of a culture that may emerge among a population of unjustly imprisoned or isolated individuals. Are you saying duties of mutual concern between members may be incompatible with such a culture, on account of the involuntary nature of their confinement?"

Yes and no. Yes, these people can (and likely will) feel a strong sense of mutual concern and a desire to support one another. Any duties that these people feel to one another, however, will not be duties that they enter into through the state. Some prisoners may, for example, organize their own system of support (save broth for the sick, band together to fight against renegade prisoners and abusive guards), but no, I don't think that one can say that any prisoner has a duty to enter into such a scheme of mutual support, and any efforts made by the illegitimate "state" (i.e.) the guards to force them to care for one another would also be illegitimate. For institutional duties (taxes, military service, etc.) to emerge, people must be constrained by rules that they could not reasonably reject.

[Paul Kelleher]

I think of the duty I'm exploring as a function of two elements: the coercion I help impose, and the strained cooperation (strained in part, but not exclusively, by the fact of coercion) that I receive from others. I take it you agree the second element can exist in the imprisoned community. Ok, good. That's a start.

You are correct that I must initially be justified in coercing others through the state for all of this to get off the ground. I don't deny that. But does there need to be an opt out in order for my coercion to be justified? I don't believe so, although I have not yet argued for this. Dialectically, the Friedman is useful because he's a libertarian-type who nevertheless views a great deal of state coercion as legitimate. But of course I don't want to settle for merely dialectically successful arguments. So I need something more.

As you know, in addressing this problem, Rawls appealed to a "natural duty of justice": he believed there is a natural duty we all have to support just institutions. This enables him to argue that *if* a society governed by his principles is in fact just, then coercing people to obey is fine, since they already have a natural duty to obey (Rawls also needs the premise that the natural duty is coercively enforceable.) This is in general Miller's approach as well, I believe (although he passes over it quickly).

It also seems to be Scanlon's view, which I bring up because of your last five words. Nothing you say in the last comment is inconsistent with the claim that there is just one reasonable approach to self-governance in the imprisoned community. Even if some prisoners wish to band together to fight against abusive guards, there may be good reason to think permitting such gangs will make a very bad situation much worse. It is possible, then, that no one can reasonably object to an arrangement that forbids some forms of risky activity, but nevertheless leaves scope for something like an evolving general will on other key issues. So although you appeal to Scanlon's formula, nothing yet shows that an inescapable and coercive framework within the community will always be reasonable rejectable. (I'm here using that Scanlonian language, even though I don't find it very helpful in the main.) As Scanlon notes in his review of Anarchy, State, and Utopia:

"[For Rawls,] Where there is a moral requirement to comply with nonvoluntary institutions such as the state, this requirement derives (via what Rawls calls the Natural Duty of Justice) merely from the fact that those institutions are just."

Go back now to the dialectical argument. I was letting Friedman do some of this work for me, since he agrees that it would be socially disastrous not to have a central bank that can help smooth out the business cycle and act as lender of last resort. If he is right, then a society that uses coercion to enforce central banking policy might not be reasonably rejectable. Does this mean others have a natural duty of justice to support this society? I don't know; I don't have a view on that. But I see no reason yet to think that the mere fact of coercion, which is needed to preserve arrangements that ward of social disaster, makes a situation reasonably rejectable by those who dislike the arrangement.

Thanks for pressing; this is helpful.